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The “War on Terror” and Non-alignment
Andrew Newby and Gavan Titley
Against such an enemy, there can be no neutrality.
—President George W. Bush, March 11, 2002
Two European Union countries—Ireland and Finland—could never be called
“enemies” of America. Nevertheless, they remain, for historical and pragmatic
reasons, outside any formal military alliances. Because of this non-alignment,
they have been pressured since 9/11 to state exactly where they stand in relation
to the U.S. and its “War on Terror.” Both are members of NATO’s Partnership
for Peace (PfP) initiative, and their positions are closer to what James Skelly has
described as “impartial” rather than isolationist neutrality.
Finnish soldiers have served with distinction in peace-keeping operations and
their diplomats have been seen as honest brokers in Yugoslavia and Northern
Ireland. Irish soldiers have helped to keep the fragile peace in Lebanon and East
Timor, and Ireland has provided the UN with major figures such as Mary
Robinson and Dennis Halliday. The importance the citizens of these countries
has given to the role of the UN in world affairs was amply illustrated in the
anti-war demonstrations of early 2003, when the light-blue flags of the UN were
much in evidence in Helsinki and Dublin.
Some parties claim that non-alignment remains so popular with the Finnish
and Irish people because they fail to understand contemporary geopolitics. Yet,
it is more than coincidence that both countries witnessed at close hand some of
the hypocrisy at work in the War on Terror. Finland borders Russia, whose
government has used much of the Bush rhetoric to justify a mutually destructive
campaign in Chechnya. The Irish, similarly, have observed for decades the way
the British government has conducted a “dirty war” in Northern Ireland. With
this experience comes a realization that terror, whatever form it takes, can
seldom be beaten by violence. By contrast, and perhaps by necessity, the
governments of these countries have obfuscated the issue in order to be all things
to all people. The high-wire act that both have performed in order to convince
their electorates that their non-aligned status is intact, and yet at the same time
keep in Bush’s good books, has produced great elasticity in definitions of
neutrality.
W
hile the question of Finland becoming a full member of NATO is far from
new, alliance supporters quickly took advantage of 9/11 and the military
adventures it precipitated in order to press their case. The accession of Finland’s
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Baltic neighbors to NATO has added to this impetus, and the disconnection
between the citizenry and its government is highlighted by polls from early 2003,
which put opposition to NATO at 80 percent, and yet at the same time showed
that 70 percent of Finns accepted that membership was, in any case, inevitable.
The Finnish government has repeatedly denied any such inevitability, and the
public’s impression illustrates just how much the small minority of NATO
supporters have been allowed to set the media agenda.
With the world awaiting the U.S. attack on Iraq, December 2002 saw the then
Finnish Prime Minister, Paavo Lipponen, meet the American President in
Washington, DC. Bush claimed that while he respected Finland’s non-alignment,
the door was open for them to join NATO at any time. The same line was taken
by NATO Secretary General George Robertson on a visit to Helsinki one month
later. Certainly, those with an interest in expanding NATO are too smart to
alienate Finnish public opinion even further by making direct demands that
Finland should join the alliance. Rather, the brief non-committal remarks by
Bush and Robertson allow them to keep the issue simmering gently, while their
work is done, ever so subtly, within Finland itself.
Here, we find a self-appointed elite using a variety of methods to erode Finnish
non-alignment, trying as much as possible to bypass the electorate. This cabal
breaks down into roughly three groups: the military, a handful of foreign
diplomatic missions in Helsinki, and small sections of influential media organiza-
tions.
If Finland joins NATO in the foreseeable future it will certainly be against the
wishes of the majority of the population. Normal notions of democracy, however,
can be easily bypassed, which is why military mandarins and fading former
diplomats or politicians have been left to promote the NATO cause. In
December 2002, an article in the influential Helsingin Sanomat newspaper clearly
illustrated the insidious nature of the ongoing NATO campaign. It argued that
a program of education should be started among the Finnish people to make
them tolerant of NATO. First, the argument ran, the “elite” must be convinced,
and then teaching the plebs could begin.
Former UK ambassador Alyson Bailes pursued a similar line during her time
in Finland, and boasted recently that, among the Nordic countries, it was “no
coincidence that Finland is having the most open and energetic debate … about
a basic policy change, i.e. joining NATO.” This is at once misleading and
extremely instructive. The lively and open debate is entirely mythical, with a
semi-covert campaign in favor of Finnish NATO membership being carried out
among this “elite” via spin in newspapers and TV. The main approach, as
propounded by NATO spokespeople such as Zbigniew Brzezinski and Finland’s
former NATO ambassador Leif Blomqvist, is a gradualist one, a belief that
Finland’s drift towards NATO is as inevitable as was its accession to the EU in
1995.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization supporters have also tried to ingrain a
sense of shame for what they describe as cowardly non-interventionism, or
“neutralism”—presumably changing the ending of the word “neutrality” to
“-ism” is to stigmatize the notion. A typical example was published in the
Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy 2003 by a Helsinki-based British researcher, Toby
Archer. Here, we read that during NATO’s Balkan bombing campaign,
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insular Finnish people “put the sovereignty of Yugoslavia above the human
rights of the Kosovars.” Utterly absent is the kind of critical discourse that can
be found in NATO countries themselves: of NATO’s role in the ethnic cleansing
of Serbia and Kosovo; the use of depleted uranium; the arming of the Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA) (ironically, of course, known at the time to be part of the
vague al-Qaeda network); the targeting of civilians; or the smart-bomb technol-
ogy that flattened the Chinese Embassy and strayed into Bulgaria.
After quoting another Helsingin Sanomat op-ed piece, albeit one translated into
English, Archer remarks that “this [Cold War] attitude is seen in the continuing
support for Finland staying out of direct involvement in conflicts in the inter-
national arena, but is also visible in the insularity and times [sic] xenophobic
nature of society domestically.” This is at best intellectually lazy and at worst it
is overt propaganda, again detached from the debates going on in NATO
member states about the alliance’s relevance in the “New World Order.” The
United States, it seems, is going to be far more content to lead loose “coalitions
of the willing” than a formal, potentially truculent, alliance. Conversely, Ger-
many and France are increasingly concerned with trying to develop a purely
European alternative. Incidentally, it seems that around half of all Finns are
willing to accept an EU defense force, a recent statistic that pours scorn on the
“racist” or “insular” thesis put forward by Archer and his ilk.
I
reland’s relatively recent introduction to NATO via PfP has prevented the
issue of full membership from seeping into general political discourse. And yet,
the two years that have passed since 9/11 have seen Irish non-alignment become
one of the most fiercely debated political issues on the island. Despite the Fianna
Fa´il government’s reluctance to discuss the conversion of Shannon airport into
a staging post for the U.S. military, public debate in Ireland began to question
both its constitutionality and its morality. While the government equivocated on
neutrality, it was unambiguously aligned in praise lavished elsewhere. In a St.
Patrick’s Day address in Lowell, Massachusetts during his 2002 campaign for
Congress, Marty Meehan noted that “Ireland has played a key role in the
international coalition against terrorism. American military planes are landing
and reloading at Irish airports.” Earlier, in October 2001, the widow of a former
U.S. ambassador to Ireland said that “It is unreasonable at the moment to say
you are neutral. We are fighting terrorism and we are in this together; Ireland
and the United States are as friends and family in this.”
The presence of a large Irish diaspora in America has placed Ireland in a
different position from Finland in terms of the direct influence of 9/11. It is
believed that no Finn lost their life in the terror attacks, whereas we need only
examine the names of the dead of the New York Fire Department to see a
sizeable number of Irish and Irish-American victims. Taoiseach Bertie Ahern’s
offer of assistance to Bush was quickly accepted, and less than a fortnight after
the attacks over 2,000 U.S. troops had already used Shannon as a transit point
for Afghanistan.
Thus, although scarcely making an impression on the mainstream media, the
Irish Green Party lamented that after a year of Fianna Fa´il’s collaboration in the
“War on Terror” the national policy of neutrality was in “tatters.” It was claimed
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that “the Americans now treat Shannon as a domestic military airport. Soldiers
in desert fatigues can be seen walking around the airport complex and will talk
openly about their destination.” Recently, Shannon “warport” has become the
focus of nationwide days of protest, and a peace camp has been established there
both to focus the protest and to monitor military activity. Ploughshare actions
against American military hardware have been taken on several occasions,
leading to the deployment of the non-aligned Irish army to protect the Shannon
perimeter and transiting U.S. forces against Irish citizens.
Criticism of the Irish government, claiming it has no control over or knowl-
edge of what military personnel ferry with them through Shannon—thus
contravening the Constitution—finally brought the matter into the open. Ahern,
typically, backed off, claiming “I don’t think that’s very correct” that the Marines
were armed in transit. Later, in explaining the elasticity of the Irish government’s
impartiality, on the eve of the latest Gulf War, the Taoiseach argued that while
Ireland had “made it clear that a second UN resolution” was needed to legalize
the war, it was also recognized that “the U.S. and the UK believed they have
a mandate from existing UN resolutions, to wage war on Iraq.”
T
he widespread opposition to ditching non-alignment in both Finland and
Ireland has caused their respective governments to play a dangerous, even
duplicitous, game with the U.S. With this in mind, maybe it is not surprising that
interested parties have started referring to them as “former EU neutrals.” When
Paavo Lipponen visited Washington in December 2002 he told Bush how much
the Finnish people “appreciated his leadership,” which may have been nice for
the President to hear, but was a patent untruth. Another, unspecified, comment
from Lipponen led the U.S. to thank Finland for being a valuable member of the
“Coalition of the Willing,” which it supposedly was not. Incredibly, the issue of
where this non-aligned country stood in relation to the Iraq war dominated the
spring 2003 general election campaign, and it seems that the constant badgering
of Lipponen by Centre Party leader Anneli Ja¨a¨tteenma¨ki contributed to the
latter’s eventual victory. After only two months in power, Ja¨a¨tteenma¨ki was
forced to resign because the documents used against Lipponen had been
classified. But this has overshadowed another important issue—what did Lip-
ponen actually say to Bush on behalf of his citizens?
Lipponen’s actions typify the increasing disconnection in many countries
between the people and the politicians they have chosen to represent them.
Recent members of the “Coalition of the Willing,” such as Italy, Spain and—
though to a lesser extent—Britain and Estonia, have all ridden roughshod over
mass demonstrations of their citizens against the war in Iraq. Lipponen, es-
pecially since losing his position as prime minister, has criticized the Finnish
people for their negative attitude toward the Americans. He has begun articulat-
ing the view commonly presented by opponents of non-alignment in the Finnish
military and media: that Finns are afraid of confrontation because of deep-held
hang-ups about Russia.
Such a viewpoint, while attempting to justify the gradual erosion of non-align-
ment, itself falls foul of the accusation of insularity, for it is only tenable if one
ignores the situation elsewhere. The Finnish public’s opposition to Operation
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Iraqi Freedom, for example, was mirrored in other countries of vastly divergent
profiles, such as Argentina, Switzerland, Russia and Pakistan. To distil the
argument down to a debilitating inferiority complex on the part of the Finnish
people oversimplifies their strong attachment to non-alignment, but it is the
mainstay of the gradualists’ rhetoric. With the U.S. now a more important
export market for Finland than Russia, Lipponen’s promptings smack of econ-
omic opportunism rather than ideology.
Market forces, not morality, now drive the piecemeal compromising of
non-alignment in Finland and Ireland. In its founding statement, the Project for
a New American Century demanded increased cooperation with America’s
“democratic allies” to secure the U.S.’s position in the world. William Kristol has
spoken of NATO expansion as a means of institutionalizing the “Coalition of the
Willing.” More recently, Robert Zoellick, Bush’s trade-relations expert, described
the need for the U.S. to cultivate a “coalition of liberalizers,” explicitly linking
alliance with trade.
The Irish government was prepared to court derision over Shannon not just
out of nostalgic transatlanticism, but out of fear of being, to coin a phrase,
“Yemenized.” In voting against the resolution authorizing Bush, senior to attack
Iraq in 1991, Yemen was regarded, in the words of one U.S. diplomat, to have
uttered the most expensive “no” in history. Writing in the Irish Times, Bill
McSweeney argued that Irish diplomacy during its recent stint on the UN
Security Council was conducted with an awareness of the serious economic
damage that would reward a lack of ethical pliability, or as he put it, for any
“slow learner” in the Irish Foreign Ministry it was “enough to mention Intel,
Microsoft, Dell, and what happened to Yemen in 1990, to decipher the code and
press the point home.”
McSweeney’s emphasis on the centrality of inward investment into Ireland’s
software industry suggests ways that global economic interconnectedness can be
used to advance unilateral political agendas, a point made all the more shabbily
obvious by the overt politicization of aid and trade in the run-up to a proposed
second resolution authorizing an attack on Iraq. Other evidence also suggests
that this very industry in Ireland is compromising non-alignment through
business as usual.
Investigations by Amnesty Ireland and the Irish Examiner newspaper have
uncovered Irish companies exporting weapons components and, more recently,
software crucial to the U.S. and French nuclear programs. Embarrassingly, some
of the companies involved in this have been grant aided by the Investment and
Development Agency (IDA), and potential pleas of government ignorance jar
with a 500 percent increase in military licenses issued by the Department of
Enterprise and Employment over the last five years.
Similarly, it is no coincidence that in Finland the main civilian supporters of
NATO have also been keen to liberalize the Finnish economy. The role of these
people in agenda setting was questioned by Erkki Tuomioja, Finland’s Foreign
Minister, who stated that “the proponents of neo-liberalism in Finland are not
really so active or prominent in politics as in the media or in some academic
circles.” The same point can be made for NATO, and the two issues are
explicitly connected in Toby Archer’s article. Archer seeks to impute racist
motives for the reluctance of the “insular” Finnish people to engage in NATO
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or U.S.-led campaigns, and links economic liberalism to vague security issues,
claiming that “the social democratic model, supported by … high tax rates, that
exists in Finland may also add to this insularity.”
Direct U.S. investment in Finland is less obvious than in Ireland, and the links
between economics and alignment have not, as yet, been widely examined. The
fact remains, however, that a handful of multinationals play a vital role in
Finnish business life, and the boards of these companies are not likely to be
impressed by a government that antagonizes its most important customers.
Nokia, for example, the greatest symbol of the Finnish high-tech success story,
has spent a great deal of time, energy and money in achieving its pre-eminence
over Motorola in what is its single largest market—the U.S.. Pulp and paper
giants such as UPM Kymmene and Stora Enso, likewise, have significant
business interests in the U.S. Conversely, many U.S. companies have used
Finland as an entrepoˆt to the “newly liberalized” Russian market. If equivocation
over the War on Terror began to cloud trade relations, positioning Finland in
Donald Rumsfeld’s “Old Europe,” these companies could easily move across the
Baltic to Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania, all new NATO members and all firmly
established, at least in their governments’ minds, in “New Europe.”
Just as some Irish-based companies benefit from military activity, the Finnish
munitions company Patria, partly state owned, continued to supply grenade
launchers to the American army in 2003, despite a directive that Finland is not
supposed to arm countries at war. Apparently this rule can be easily subverted.
In a piece of logic Bertie Ahern would have admired, Patria claimed that the
order was taken before America attacked Iraq and, apparently, the launchers
were not to be ready until after the war ended. Not only does this display moral
elasticity, it seems that Finnish defense sources know more about the campaign
in the Gulf than the U.S.’s own generals, who had little notion of its duration at
the time of Patria’s announcement.
The obvious economic threats made towards France and Germany in regard
to their recent support for the UN clearly resonate in smaller countries that trade
with the U.S. But if the “War on Terror” is so transparently righteous, such
blackmail would not be necessary. Bertie Ahern’s almost painful squirming was
summed up thus in one Dublin newspaper: “regarding the Government’s stance
on the Iraq war, Ahern could drop all the nonsense about UN resolutions and
tell it like it really is: ‘We’re an irrelevant, tiny island on the periphery of Europe.
We have no influence at all but we’d be screwed without U.S. investment and
there’s no way we are going to jeopardize that.’ ” Like Finland, Ireland was
thanked by George W. Bush for its help, and Ahern admitted to Parliament that
he presumed the Americans did, in fact, include Ireland as part of their coalition.
On a recent visit to Ireland, Nelson Mandela defended the UN and criticized
the Irish government for being afraid of the Bush administration. In short, the
U.S. economy is not only backed up by the iron fist of the military, but also by
diplomats whispering “Yemen” into the ears of trade ministers, eager to stress
what might happen to a country’s economy if trade relations with the U.S.
deteriorated. Few leaders have been as bold in speaking out on behalf of their
people as New Zealand’s Prime Minister, Helen Clark. Despite losing out on
U.S. trade to neighboring Australia, where leader John Howard has been a keen
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ally of Bush, Clark maintains that “we have to be free as a sovereign country to
make our own foreign policy.”
N
eutrality in both Ireland and Finland is therefore being eroded by what we
could call “zones of alignment”—Shannon airport and certain industrial
parks act as internationalized spaces for personnel and materials at odds with the
stated policy of the nation state that contains them. They are being de-neutral-
ized in a patchwork fashion rather than through a seismic shift of alliance.
Ireland, in particular, has been noted recently for its naturalized neo-iberalism,
and both Shannon airport and the emerging arms trade have been defended as
enlightened self-interest in a globalized economy dependent on U.S.-based
transnationals and tourism. The globalized nature of terrorism’s logics and
targets does not appear to dent the case for self-interest, whatever the broader
ethical considerations.
Although the pressure and propaganda relating to NATO or, indeed, “the
Coalition of the Willing” may intensify, the Finnish and Irish people still believe
the world needs impartial countries more than the U.S. needs extra servants to
carry out its foreign policy. There is, however, a growing gap between democra-
cies and their representatives which, if not addressed, will rapidly make George
W. Bush’s idea of a world simply consisting of “good” and “evil” a reality.
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